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Let the Trials Begin
IN THE LAST MONTH, since the announcement of a pro-
posed comprehensive tobacco settlement, many critics have
raised serious objections. In particular, they have properly
focused on the proposed weakening of the Food and Drug
Administration'srecentlyacquiredauthoritytoregulatenico-
tine, as well as limitations onfuture class-actionlitigation and
punitive damages. Little attention, however, has been fo-
cused on the potential public health benefits associatedwith a
wide range ofantitobacco litigation that inevitably would at
tractintensemediacoverage. The settlement ofmajortobacco
suits and the limitations on other antitobacco litigation would
mark the decline ofintense tobacco media attention that has,
over the last quarter-century, transformed the meaning of
cigarette use in American society.
Above all else, the proposed settlement would spare the to-$
bacco industry years ofdevastating publicity. Ifthe attorneys
general's cases, as well as others, are litigated, they will bring
into the open a vast array ofincriminating documents that re-
veal the industry's complete disregard for the public's health.
Thesedocuments—someofwhichhavealreadysurfaced—demﾬ
onstrate that the industry knew about the harms of smoking,
knew about its addictive qualities, and manipulated nicotine
content, all the while knowingly and aggressively marketingto
children and adolescents. The settlement maylimit further exﾬ
posure ofthe companies' internal documents.
Fordecades,thetobaccoindustryhasrepeatedlydeniedthe
harms of smoking. To continue to deny these risks—as ongoﾬ
ing trials would force the industry to do—stretches all credﾬ
ibility andunmasksthehypocrisyofthetobaccocompanies.To
continue to claimthattobacco is notmarketedto children,that
itis notaddictive, andthatit doesnotnecessarily cause cancer
and other serious disease is an untenable position. It was this
recognition that made the denials at the 1994 Waxman hearﾬ
ings, in which tobacco executives claimed that they did not
"believe" tobacco was addictive, so newsworthy.
Although it is impossible to put a dollar value on this antiﾬ
tobaccopublicity, historyhas shownthatsuchrevelationshave
had an important impact on public attitudes and practices reﾬ
garding cigarette smoking. And time has shown that the me-
diaattentiongeneratedbyhigh-profiletrials alsoprovides the
public with an education about the hazards oftobacco and the
industry's duplicity. Public outrage atthe greed and deception
of the industry provides a powerful incentive for smokers to
quit. Eventhoughthe companieshaveuntilrecently prevailed
in the courts, in the court ofpublic opinion they have repeatﾬ
edly lost.
This, perhaps more than any other reason, explains the inﾬ
dustry's eagerness to reach a settlement at this time. They
want to get tobacco out of the news. Imagine the headlines,
multipliedby40state suits andhundreds ofotherclassactions.
Imaginethecoverage onthenationalnetworks,the court chanﾬ
nels, the news channels, and the newspapers. The American
public, attunedtothe dramaofthe courtroom,willfollowthese
trials with rapt attention. Furthermore, the publicity attenﾬ
danttothetrialswillhelp to generate the politicalwillto enact
new and even more aggressive public health programs to reﾬ
duce smoking. The visibility of the trials could well lead to
many ofthe proposed settlement's most important provisions
without any major concessions to the industry.
What the industry really dreads is the incessant drumbeat
aboutthehealth consequences ofsmokingthatwillresult from
suits by the attorneys general of 40 states over the next sevﾬ
eral years. The tobacco companies' desire for a settlement
makes clear how eager they are to avoid the media spotlight.
A tobacco company executive recently was quoted as saying
that the settlement would "bring to an end the demonization
of tobacco." No cases, no news. No news, no public outcry
about industry malfeasance. The settlement, in this fundaﾬ
mental respect, is about the relegitimation of a now deviant
industry.
The proposed settlement provides funding for antitobacco
education and publicity. Public service announcements and
antitobacco education may in part help to stem the tide of
recent increases in teen smoking. But it is important to reﾬ
member that perhaps the most powerful and effective antitoﾬ
bacco education is in the history of deception and greed that
would be so prominently and publicly revealed through the
trials. Theproposed settlementwouldallbutsilencethe public
forum of the courts.
Let the trials begin.
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